Results of ACRO’s monitoring in South Korea

(8th of October 2012 update)

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After the nuclear disaster of Fukushima, ACRO has extended its Citizen Watch of Radioactivity in the Environment to Japan.
We also received samples from South Korea.

AUGUST 2011 :
Samples collected in eastern South Korea

Wallpaper sample from South Korea

AUGUST 2012 :
Infant milk from South Korea

See data below


tab kr en


Download the analysis report

tab occ papier peint en


ACRO analysed wallpaper from Korea at the request of the NGO “Save Child Korea”.
This paper is highly contaminated by natural radioactive elements that have been concentrated.
It is:
–          uranium 238 that decays into a chain of other radioactive elements. For each of them, the concentration is of the order of 1,000 Bq/kg;
–          uranium 235, present in lower quantity, as in nature. Even if the decay products were not identified, they should also be present in the paper;
–          thorium 232 that decays into a chain of other radioactive elements. For each of them, the concentration is of the order of 8,000 Bq/kg;

ACRO also checked various part of the wallpaper to see if a given pigment could explain such a level of radioactivity. It appears that the contamination is quite uniform.
Such levels of radioactivity are anomalously high. They are higher than the exemption levels fixed by the Euratom 96/29 directive. If the concentration of thorium 232 is larger than 1,000 Bq/kg, the product should be considered as a radioactive matter. The threshold is the same for the uranium 238.
In Europe, the production of such a product should be considered as a nuclear activity that requires authorizations and strict rules for the workers and the waste.
The French law forbids the introduction of radioelements into goods expected if it is authorized after justification. The use of this wallpaper leads to an irradiation of the inhabitants that is small but continuous and not justified.

As a consequence this wallpaper should be withdrawn from the market and considered as a radioactive waste.

This wallpaper was made by Daedong Wallpaper ( ) that bankrupted in July 2011. The factory is located in Gimhae and is very probably also contaminated. It is callOCC_en1ed “Spring Vivid”.

In its patent, the company pretends: “Disclosed is functional wallpaper comprising tourmaline and elvan powders so as to emit anions and far infrared rays. The functional wallpaper comprises a base layer, a layer formed of a foamed polyvinyl chloride resin comprising tourmaline and elvan powder, and a print layer, when viewed from the bottom surface adhered to a wall surface. The functional wallpaper emits a great amount of anions and far infrared rays, and thus refreshes indoor environments and provides excellent effects favorable to the human body.”



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Fukushima disaster – New data on the contamination of Japanese children

Fukushima disaster – New data on the contamination of Japanese children

福島県の災害 – 日本の子供の汚染に関する新たなデータ

French version

Fukushima’s kids treated as nuclear workers

ACRO, July 2011

All the children of Fukushima City that had their urine samples tested at ACRO’s laboratory were contaminated with radioactive fallout from the nuclear accident located approximately 60 km away.

ACRO analysed the urine of 10 children to answer to the questions of the parents about internal contamination and the results are without any ambiguity: all samples are tainted by cesium 134 and cesium 137 at concentrations ranging from 0.4 to 1.3 becquerel per liter.

This means that all these children have internal contamination by cesium 134 and 137 and were most probably also contaminated by other short-lived radionuclides like iodine 131. As they all live in a town 60 km from the NPP and eat food from the local supermarkets, other children living closer to the NPP or eating vegetables from the garden might be more contaminated.

At this stage, it is difficult to evaluate the internal contamination and the health consequences from these data. We should learn how and when these children were contaminated. By the food? By breathing?

But these results should encourage the Japanese authorities to systematically measure the internal contamination of people who have been exposed to the radioactive plume and those living in contaminated territories and are therefore probably subjected to chronic contamination. This can be accomplished without technical difficulty. However, only external exposure is taken into account now.

Let me explain. All matter around us, water, air, earth … and we are made up of atoms. Some of these atoms are called “radioactive”. They can emit radiation which can be seen as the firing of a small shell, even smaller than the atom itself. These small shells are dangerous because they can penetrate the human body as when you go to an X-ray.

A radioactive atom has no target. If it is next to us, it is likely that the shells go far away. But if you eat contaminated vegetables, drink polluted water and breathe air polluted by radioactive atoms, the shells fired by the atoms in the body will do damage every time! Thus, contaminated food may not be dangerous if it is on the plate before us and become dangerous if swallowed.

To define evacuation zones, the Japanese authorities only take into account the soil contamination that cause external radiation, ie the shells fired on the outside of the body. But we must add the internal contamination which is currently completely omitted from the calculations of radiation exposure. As soil and vegetables grown on site are also contaminated, this internal contamination might continue.

This also reinforces the idea that the limit set by the Japanese authorities to determine evacuation areas is too high. It is fixed at 20 millisieverts per year, which is strongly criticized by many organizations including ACRO. The sievert is the unit used to measure the damage caused by radiation on the body. This limit is two times more than the French one in case of nuclear accidents and twenty times higher than the maximum allowable limit for the public under normal circumstances.

The limit of 20 millisieverts is the one that applies to the most exposed nuclear workers. Their exposure doses would be monitored and be entitled to medical care. As nuclear workers, children of Fukushima would have a limit of 20 millisieverts. As nuclear workers, school children would be equipped with dosimeters to measure external radiation dose they receive. But unlike these workers, the children did not choose to be in that environment.

For a worker’s nuclear internal contamination must be exceptional. For some of the children in Fukushima, this may be routine…

It is therefore imperative that families have access to the measurement of radioactivity. This is why ACRO has launched a subscription to open an independent laboratory for analysis of radioactivity in Japan.

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The children of Fukushima are contaminated

Press release, June 30th, 2011 (Download pdf)

ACRO has analyzed urine of children living in Fukushima-city located at about 60 km of the Fukushima NPP. There is no ambiguity on the results: all samples are tainted by cesium 134 and cesium 137 at concentrations ranging from 0.4 to 1.3 becquerels per litre.

This means that these children between 6 and 16 years old are all contaminated by cesium 134 and cesium 137. There were also probably contaminated by iodine 131 that disappears quickly and cannot be detected now.

It is difficult to evaluate the contamination of the whole body from these data. It is a strong incitation for the Japanese authorities to systematically measure the internal contamination of the people exposed to the radioactive plumes and of the people living in the contaminated territories. This can be easily done (by anthropogammametry).

The results of the measurement of the internal contamination should then be taken into account in the evaluation of the dose absorbed by the population.

 This reinforces our opinion that the evacuation threshold fixed by the Japanese authorities is too high. Many NGO’s, including ACRO, have criticized this limit that is fixed at 20 millisieverts for the first year. It is 2 times larger that limit fixed by the French authorities in case of an accident and 20 times larger than the usual maximum permissible dose for the public.

 This internal contamination is due to the exposition to the radioactive plume and/or to the tainted food. It should be added to the other ways of exposition of the population due to the radioactive pollution. The limit of the permissible dose due to these other ways of exposition should be decreased.

Results online here

French version

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Radioactivity explained to children

138, rue de l’Eglise
14200 Hérouville St Clair

All matter around us, water, air, earth… we are made of small grains, very small grains called “atoms”. There are 92 different kinds altogether. As with Lego blocks, everything in the universe, from stars to us, is “manufactured” from these 92 atoms. There are other man-made atoms.

Each atom has a name: the number 1, which is the smallest, is called “hydrogen” and No. 92, which is heaviest in nature, “uranium.” In between, there are certainly names that you know, like oxygen, gold, iron … Two hydrogen atoms attached to an oxygen atom form a small block that is water.

But I digress. Some of these atoms are said to be “radioactive.” Like a cannon, they can fire a small shell even smaller than the atom itself. These small shells are dangerous because they can penetrate the human body as when you go to an X-ray.

In a nuclear reactor, there are a lot of radioactive atoms that fire shells. That is why they are locked in a vault called “containment.” The problem at the Fukushima plant is that the radioactive atoms escape into the water and in air. Some fall near the plant, others are carried by winds around the Earth.

A radioactive atom has no target. If it is next to us, it is likely that the shells go away. But if you eat contaminated vegetables, drink polluted water or breathe air polluted by radioactive atoms, the shells fired by the atoms in the body will do damage every time!

Obviously, there are many more atoms that fall near the power plant. Therefore, the power plant and its surroundings are contaminated by radioactive atoms that fire in every directions.

Workers on site protect themselves in a garment that covers them completely and put a mask on the face to avoid breathing radioactive dust. But they can do nothing against the bombing from radioactivity and cannot stay long there.

When you are away and there are few radioactive atoms, you are less likely to be bombed. The main problem is food and drink.

Most of the radioactive atoms can fire only once, one or two shells at a time. Then they are no longer radioactive. Some fire very quickly and the pollution does not last long due to lack of ammunition. This is the case for the atom called “iodine 131” which was rejected by the Fukushima nuclear power plant. After eight days, only the half of them are radioactive. After sixteen days, only a quarter remains. And so on … As the atom called “cesium 137”, it takes thirty years and therefore the radioactive pollution will remain a long time! The pollution should be monitored for years to protect oneselves.

The becquerel is used to count the number of radioactive atoms: if you are told there is 1000 becquerels, it means that there are 1000 shelling per second.

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Make a donation for Japan

ACRO raised funds to help the Japanese citizens to monitor radioactivity in the environment, foodstuffs…
We have collected enough funds to order the best detector on the market for a citizen laboratory in Japan.
We have stopped collecting funds for this project. Thank you very much for the support.

A new NGO named Chikurin (ちくりん舎) operates the new laboratory. It is situated in the suburbs of Tokyo. Here are some pictures:

Entrance of Chikurin-sha (竹林舎), which means the "hut in the bamboo grove"

Entrance of Chikurin-sha (竹林舎), which means the “hut in the bamboo grove”

View of the laboratory

View of the laboratory

Measurement room with two germanium detectors (only one is used for the moment) and a NaI scintillator

Measurement room with two germanium detectors (only one is used for the moment) and a NaI scintillator


First Germanium detector in front of the lead shield. On the left one can see the simpler NaI detector in use since January 2012.

First Germanium detector in front of the lead shield.
On the left one can see the simpler NaI detector in use since January 2012.

Vue on Chikurin's laboratory

Vue on Chikurin’s laboratory



Lead shield

Lead shield

Installation of the lead shield

Installation of the lead shield

ACRO is a NPO that was created just after the Chernobyl disaster in 1986 and has been monitoring radioactivity in the environment for 25 years together with the concerned populations. It runs a laboratory with the highest scientific standards that is accredited by the French authorities. Its activity is complementary to the official monitoring because it is aimed to answer to the questions of the population.

ACRO was involved during several years in a project in the contaminated areas of Byelorussia to implement radioactivity measurement stations in villages and develop a culture of radioprotection. The European Union and the Swiss ministry of foreign affairs supported our contribution.

Our plans in Japan are to help the creation of similar projects. ACRO have been in contact with several local NGOs for many years and is currently working with them on the project. In the mean time, we are analyzing the samples in France.

More information will be posted on this web page.

Contact :

Paypal :

Bank transfer :

138 rue de l’Eglise
14200 Herouville St Clair



IBAN : FR76 4255 9000 7521 0282 3250 411

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Nuclear Wastes Management: The Lessons from the CSM Disposal Site (Centre de Stockage de la Manche)

Memory-less Centre, Future-less Centre?

Realized for Greenpeace France
23rd may 2006

Realized for Greenpeace France
23rd may 2006

Synthesis: the lessons from the CSM disposal site (Centre de Stockage de la Manche)
The past was dead and the future unconceivable” George Orwell, 1984

For the CEA, which was responsible for it during all its active phase, “the CSM site, after twenty-five years of good and faithful services, has now become an international reference regarding the techniques of wastes disposal.” As the future of French nuclear wastes is currently being debated, we find important to draw the lessons from the management of this site.

Because the storage preceded the regulations in that field, the site is no longer satisfactory in regard to the current surface disposal standards. All sorts of things were disposed of and stored there, on the ridge of ground water and without any weather protection. Regarding the older wastes, the inventory was of the most whimsical kind and very likely bellow reality. But the most serious part is that the CEA sites have rapidly ridden themselves of embarassing wastes before the regulations became stronger. The Turpin Commission has shown evidence of this fact in the case of plutonium. This crime commited is very shocking because the knowledge implying procedures revision was elaborated in the very same organization. Over 10% of the volume stored in the site is of foreign origins, in spite of a French law forbidding this practice.

Due to the large amount of long life elements and the toxic chimicals it contains, the CSM will never go back to the ordinary and it will remain forever. Its status is therefore distinct from that of the CSA (which only receives wastes material selected according to strict criteria); it is actually closer to what could be an underground disposal site supposed to receive, far from sight, all the embarassing wastes. The geological barrier only delays slightly the surfacing of problems.

Because of its empirical management, it is causing damage to the environment. Consequently to the repeating incidents which added up to a constant and diffuse release, the ground water and many outlets are highly contaminated with tritium. We must note that for a long time there was a lack of information regarding this chronic pollution, and even now a precise assessment of its impacts still needs to be done. As far as the situation, it could worsen in the long run because there is no garanty that the wrappings of the older wastes, which also contain more hazardous elements, will last for such long periods of time. When a new contamination is detected it will be too late.

In spite of this, there is no dismantling plan of the site, not even a partial one. The argument generally put forward, besides the economic costs of the operation, is the health risks posed by the operation which would be greater than the risks related to its impact on the environment. On top of it, there is no other solution for the extracted wastes which should not be accepted by the CSA. It is therefore more comfortable for the nuclear officials and the public authorities to consider this matter settled.

How then can this center be given in heritage to the future generations ?
How will memory be transmitted if even our generation does not know exactly anymore what is in it ?
Above all, how can we give them the possibility of an opinion regarding their future which would be different from that which is currently underway ?
These fundamental questions must be considered for all the other radioactive wastes.

The CSM exemple shows us how vain a long term passive management based on forgetting is. The supposed reversability of the forecoming storage is only delaying for a few generations the shutting down dilemma, without solving it.

The protection of the future generations draws consensus when discussing the management of nuclear wastes. But when it is about the current generation, the consensus vanishes… The public is absent from the waste management legislation project presented by the government, which ignores the public consultation it ordered. Now, if the CSM is a memory-less center, it is because the management was done behind closed doors and it is important not to repeat this.

The well-being of the future generations, for whom the wastes management must be limitted, therefore often appears as a thoughtless reflection used to make anything pass. Leaving them means of action implies keeping the memory of this burden alive. Historical examples show that it is because of the redundancy of information preserved under different shapes that it was possible to transmit it from generation to generation, despite unknown factors. Therefore there is a moral obligation to share the knowledge about nuclear wastes with the population. Unfortunately, the current nuclear debates have failed to mobilize crowds, because citizens had the impression that they were powerless in the decision-making process. Why get involved if the decisions have already been made ? Hence it is important to implement a democratization mechanism regarding wastes management, in order to insure its memory transmission.

The other element at stake is the transmission of a memory that would faithfully translate the inventory, which is not the case of the CSM. There again, there is a need for a democratization of the decision-making process, including more opening upstream which would give civil society enough time to appropriate the problematic. It is in this perspective that the ACRO has been working ever since its creation.

In conclusion, the safety of the future generations regarding nuclear wastes management implies a better governance in the current management, relying on a larger democracy. It would be a shame and a danger if the opportunity of the current legislation project was missed for another ten years. Even more so because unfortunately there is a considerable lateness to make up for and wastes like those at the CSM, of which the future is officially settled, still need to be addressed.

Summary of the 1st part: The universe of the CSM Disposal Site (Centre de Stockage de la Manche)

The CSM Disposal Site was built in the Eastern part of the reprocessing plant of La Hague, in a place named the « High Marshes », a particulary humid zone. This is undoubtedly the worst choice when knowing that water is safety’s worst enemy. The first wastes were stored on the very ground, and then in concrete trenches, which were regularly flooded. Some of these structures were dismantled, others are still there, on the ridge of ground water. While the storage preceded the regulations in that field, the empirism which led the construction of this site is already a source of concern which should worsen in the future.

The storage structures and the wastes quality evolved with time towards more rigour. But each strengthening of the legislation triggered a de-storing of the CEA sites during the previous years. This crime commited is very shocking because the knowledge implying procedures revision was elaborated in the very same organization. The ACRO had also denounced similar practices just before the closing down of the site in 1994. Nowadays, the CSM site contains many long life elements which are not accepted anymore at the CSA site which took over. There are, among other things, 100 kg of plutonium, as well as many other alpha emitting elements particularly toxic in case of contamination. If we add up the chimical toxics whixh will not disappear with time, including almost 20 tons oflead and one ton of mercury, the CSM site shall never go back to the ordinary. At the time of its closing down, the ANDRA shamelessly announced that this sie could go back to nature after 300 years and that its coverage was definitive.

The inventory of the stored wastes is not precisely known. During the irst years, the identification documents of the senders alone were enough. Storm errased part of this memory and the information about the first years are unreliable. Some of the storing structures too, and a part of the wastes escape the surveillance system that was set up. A retired ANDRA employee goes so far to evoque collapsing risks. In case of a problem, the ground waters will be hit an dit will be to late. According to our estimations, over 10% of the 527 217 m3 of stored wastes are of foreign origin, in total violation of the French law. While the issue of shallow storage is fficially considered as « settled », it is legitimate to wonder about the future of the CSM site. It is also necessary to draw the lessons from these setbacks for the other wastes waiting for a solution.

Without the associations’ civil surveillance and the warning revelations of an anonymous whistle blower who sent some documents to the ACRO, the ANDRA plan would have been endorsed by the authorities. The pluralistic commission which led an inquiery following the ACRO revelations in 1995 estimated that this stora is irreversible. Based on a study by the ANDRA, it indeed estimates that getting the wastes back is unreasonable because of health and financial costs. Above all, there is no solution for a part of these wastes which should not be accepted by the CSA.

Environmental requirements have evolved along the 25 years of exploitation of the CSM site. These requirements should evolve even more on time scales involving several generations. The reversibility of storage is therefore a moral constraint followng the precaution principle. It is generally though tof as a means to make projects more socially acceptable by the authorities. But reversibility is not just a technical problem and it should lead to rethink entirely the radioactives materials management in a democratic way. The option of a durable storage had the favors of the public during the national debate, but it s unfortunately ignored by the authorities which prefer a strategy based on oblivion.

The situation is the same for the CSM site. After the current phase of surveillance, a new cover is planned in order to switch to a more passive phase. The decision not to get back all or a part of the wastes is based on some ANDRA studies which received no detailed counter-assessment. We have, in vain, asked the surveillance commission of the site to promote the implementation of a pluralistic reflection which would have to consider the mentioned risks before making the decision to definitively close the site. This demend is particularly important to us before deciding to give the future generations such a threat in heritage.

Summary of the 2nd part: The water pollution of the ecosystems by tritium

In the past, the river Sainte-Hélène which runs not far from the CSM disposal site contained cesium-137 in proportions 100 to 1000 times higher than in the other neighboring streams. This abnormality was parallelled with the presence of other fission products and high quantities of plutonium: the sediments contained more than 140 Bq/kg of plutonium-238, that is 5,000 times more than the river Rhône downstream from the Creys-Malville complex (Superphénix). The CSM was the source of it. Since then, the causes have been neutralized and there are only traces left of this massive former pollution.

But at all times tritium (radioactive hydrogene) was found on site. Today still, many rivers, aquifers, resurgences and wells are concerned.

Since the very opening of the site, large amounts of tritium were disposed of. In 6 small squares of the so-called TB2 structure, the equivalent of three, maybe 15, years of tritium wastes issued from the current electric nuclear park in a whole were stored. Estimations vary depending on the era, highlighting the lack of knowledge regarding waste contents.

But this tritium was not inclined to stay in place, and in october 1976 a massive contamination of ground and surface waters started. All which could be recaptured was, and the stored amounts were radically reduced.

This incident revealed, besides dysfonctionments and an inppropriate storage procedures, the leaking of tritium through the containers and structures. This phenomenon, which started as soon as the first tritium wastes arrived, still exists today and will cease when there is no more tritium in the parcels.
Because the site manager refused to sufficiently protect the wastes from weather exposition during the 25 years of its exploitation, including while it was implementing solutions for the CSA site, the situation degraded in La Hague. The lixiviation of the wastes by rainwater considerably increased leaks.

The CSM has therefore always been “losing”, and is still “losing” its tritium under other ways than radioactive decrease, a fundamental principle of nuclear wastes elimination. The data analysis dated after 1986, which is the only data available, tends to suggest that at least 20% of the stored tritium may have “vanished” in the environment until now. In a memo dated 12/18/92, the manager even estimated at 1,850 TBq [130% of the tritium inventory of the site (ndlr)] the activity lost in the ground following the 1976 incident.

Liberated from the structures, this tritium mainly follows the natural water ways. It tends to reach the underlying aquifers but also the atmosphere. It is therefore destined to be “eliminated”, one way or another, through dilution and spreading in nature.
During the year following the october ’76 incident, the ground waters contamination could reach 600,000 Bq/L and that of the river Sainte-Hélène more than 10,000 Bq/L. It is considered that the worst is behind us. In 1983, an aquifer reached 6 million Bq/L! Experiment? Incident? Accident? The public and the neighboring population still do not know. Just as then, they do not know that “concerted” releases are being done in the river Sainte-Hélène, which led in october 1982 to a water contamination reaching 50,000 Bq/L.

After the last parcel was delivered, and the cover built, indicators then showed evidence of the beginning of an improvement process of the radiological quality of the underground waters.

Without any industrial leaks or unforseen events, the water content in tritium must be around 1 Bq/L. From a health point of view, the WHO has considered since 1993 that water destined to human consumption should not contain more than 7,800 Bq/L in tritium. As regarding Europe, since 1998 it aims not to go over 100 Bq/L.

In 2005 the pollution is not yet resorbed. It has generally declined. Still, the contamination of controled ground waters can still reach 190,000 Bq/L. And 20% of the contaminated aquifers do not show the expected reduction if we consider the radioactive decrease conjugated with the water renewal. Even stranger, some even tend to increase.

During all those years, the tritium pollution is becoming pervasive. It is geographically spreading onto the northern side. It reaches wells, resurgences and the main streams which run down the basin.
Currently, all streams (the Roteures, the Sainte-Hélène and the Grand Bel) have in common to be contaminated by tritium, at varying levels comprised between a dozen and several hundreds of becquerels per liter. Regarding the first two, the resurgences drain more contaminated waters along the first kilometer than in the stream at the same place. A few hundred meters downstream from the river Sainte-Hélène, one could measure in 2003 up to 700 Bq/L of tritium in a resurgence. And this situation is not in contrast with that which the ACRO measured a dozen years ago, this time at the foot of a family house. In the case of the river Grand Bel, polluted at the source, there again the tritium concentration in the waters has not evolved since 1994! It steadily remains between 750 ± 100 Bq/L at the source.

The observation of those last years brong up some questions. Why has the tritium contamination not radically declined as one could have expected, if we consider dilution conjugated with radioactive decrease? Even if we only consider the radioactive decrease, the levels should have decreased of 50% compared with 1994. Still, they remain approxilately the same in some points, which implies that the mobilized tritium has increased.

The resurgence and stream waters may not be directly used for human consumption, but they are for the cattle and even for the garden. In the case of a cow regularly given tritium-containing water to drink, transfers take place with the milk. They are confirmed in la Hague we refer to milk controls done by a nuclear operating structure other than the ANDRA, since the latter has not ben doing any such controls since the beginning. And the results of the transfers do not stop there. The tritium, which is radioactive hydrogene, can be “exchanged” and enter the composition of organic material, therefore of life. Flesh, fat, vegetable, etc. may be concerned. The ways to affect man then multiply. But one would have to at least want to know about them.

Cleaning the water pollution of ecosystemes is a moral necessity. It is unacceptable to watch the manager of a nuclear wastes disposal site resign when faced with a radioactive element such as tritium which he was not able to contain on site, and abandon it at the foot of houses, at the bottom of fields. It is necessary at the very least to study, as ACRO has been demanding, the possibility to use the recognized pumping method which consists in drawing from the ground water to discharge in the sea, in the hope to see a slow decline of surface waters contamination and to handle in a controled and organized way the radioactivity movements towards the environment.

Result of analysis

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