After two years of work, the radio-ecology group of the North-Cotentin Comity published its report on july 7, 1999 (The excecutive summary report is available in English at http://www.irsn.fr/nord-cotentin/). Few days before, a French weekly magasine titled "La Hague : zero danger" and the French, German and Japanese nuclear industry have been using the results to claim that reprocessing was not a dangerous activity. This is extrapolating the mission of the group which were "an estimation of the risk of leukemia among 0-24-year-old people living in the Beaumont-Hague district during 1978-1996 from the dose delivered to the bone marrow. [...] The work, therefore, could not be understood as a global risk calculation due to the nuclear facilities of the North Cotentin peninsula" (Note : quotations are from the report). Radiations may cause many other kinds of deseases. It was rather a study related to the epidemiology study done by J.F. Viel and D. Pobel which showed an increase of the number of leukemia amongst young people near the reprocessing plant of La Hague and its possible links with the sea (note : J. F. Viel, D. Pobel, A. Carre, Stat Med 1995;14:2459-72 ; D. Pobel, J.F. Viel, British Medical Journal, 314, 1997), similarily to what was done in UK around the reprocessing plants of Sellafield and Dounreay.

The estimated number of leukemia amongst young people due to the release of radioactive effluents of nuclear facilities is small, 0.0020, but not zero. To get such a figure many unknown parameters are used in the calculation and the incertities were not evaluated. "Therefore, some members of the group are considering that they cannot conclude that it is not probable that the release of radioactive effluents have an effect on the number of observed leukemia".

The report is oftenly reduced to this single figure. The group tried to have an exhaustive list of the dumped radio-elements (39 radio-elements were added to the official list) and then compare the modelisation of their behavior in the environment with a compilation of 500.000 data of radioactivity measurements. This allowed the group to have a good confidence of the modelisation of the release in the sea, except near the release pipe, but it showed that the model used for atmospheric release could not be used locally and its validation remains to be done. To get the radiation dose from the calculated or measured contamination of the environment, one has to modelise the inhabitants's way of life. Finally, the estimated number of leukemia is based on an extrapolation of the statistics of the Hiroshima-Nagasaki survivors who received a short irradiation, not a continuous contamination.

An average adult of the district received 0.005 mSv in 1996, but 0.018mSv in 1985, when the release in the sea was the highest. For a reference group of fishermen used by Cogema these figures become 0.008 in 1996 and 0.041mSv in 1985. If the same fishermen were fishing at Les Huquets, as ACRO suggested, the dose would become 0.226mSv in 1985. Note that a kid eating a single crab taken near the release pipe would get 0.313mSv. Other senarios were also investigated. Two serious accidents happenned in the past : a break in the release pipe in 1979-1980 had an estimated consequence of 0.9mSv for a fisherman and the silo's fire in 1981, 3.4mSv for downwind inhabitants.

It was the first time that such a study was done in collaboration with NGO's, but to do a real independant expertise, we should have worked full time on the project like many nuclear industry representatives did. This was not possible for an NGO volonteer. Nevertheless our role were crucial for openness. ACRO's main critic stands in the "realistic" approach which tends to underestimate the risk. For example, fishing near the release pipe was not considered "realistic" though it is possible. An "enveloppe approach" would have garanteed that possible pessimistic behaviors were included. With a calculated dose 30 times higher, which is not absurd, the probability to explain one leukemia becomes higher than 5% which is generally considered as statistically meaningful.

Therefore, for NGO members the doubt remains. "In the event of risk of serious or irreversible damage, the absence of absolute scientific certainty should not be used as pretext to give to later the adoption of effective actions aiming at preventing the environmental pollution" (precaution principle of the UN Rio conference).